Using data from 825 organizations, we examine (1) 
Introduction
Over the last decade, the idea of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) has gained substantial momentum, and many firms have implemented systems and processes to support a coordinated and integrated company-wide approach to the identification, assessment, and management of risk. Such processes and systems should help to ensure that the total portfolio of risks facing the organization remain within acceptable limits. Despite its growing importance in practice, ERM-related issues have attracted little research attention. Slowly, however, an Generally consistent with previous studies, we find that the extent of ERM implementation is influenced by the regulatory environment, internal factors, ownership structure, and firm and industry-related characteristics. As to ERM effectiveness, we find that organizations generally subscribe to a key premise of the COSO ERM framework, i.e. that ERM should address the full set of risks that affect the entity's strategic, operational, reporting, and compliance objectives. However, our results also raise some concerns as to the COSO framework. Particularly, we find no evidence that application of the COSO framework improves ERM effectiveness. Neither do we find support for the mechanistic view on risk management that is implicit in COSO's recommendations on risk appetite and tolerance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide information on the dataset. Section 3 reports on the examination of the extent of ERM implementation. Section 4 explores ERM design choices and their impact on ERM effectiveness. Finally, section 5 discusses the findings and limitations of this study.
Sample
The survey data we rely on in this paper have been made available to us by a research consortium involving representatives from PricewaterhouseCoopers, Royal NIVRA (the Dutch Institute of Chartered Public Accountants), the University of Groningen, and Nyenrode Business University 2 . The aim of this consortium was to map current ERM practices and issues in the Netherlands. The questionnaire has not been designed with the specific purposes of the current study in mind, which poses some limitations to what we can do qua variable construction and measurement. However, the data are still valuable, as they provide at least an informative insight into ERM adoption, design choices, and effectiveness.
The consortium identified organizations located in the Netherlands with annual revenues of more than EUR 10 million and more than 30 employees, using information from company.info. 9,579 organization appeared to fit these cumulative criteria. The survey was mailed to the Board of these organizations in May, 2009 . 240 questionnaires were undeliverable. Of the remaining 9,339 surveys, 928 were returned, resulting in an overall response rate of 9.9%. Upon closer examination, however, 103 responses were found not to match the initial selection criteria after all, leaving a final sample of 825 observations. Respondents are board members, CFOs, or staff members in high organizational positions. We have no data to examine representativeness. The sample, however, is relatively large, and varied in terms of organizational size and industry. Table 1 gives a general description of the dataset.
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Antecedents of ERM implementation
The idea that ERM is a key component of effective governance has gained widespread acceptance. Nevertheless, organizations vary in the extent to which they have adopted it. Some organizations have invested in sophisticated ERM systems, whereas others rely on rather ad hoc responses to risks as they become manifest. In this section of the paper, we explore a number of factors that may help to explain the level of development of ERM practices across organizations. Building on previous studies, we identify five broad groups of factors that we expect to be associated with the extent of ERM implementation: (1) regulatory influences; (2) internal influences; (3) ownership; (4) auditor influence; and (5) firm and industry-related characteristics.
Factors affecting implementation: expectations

Regulatory influences
In many countries, regulators are pressing firms to improve risk management and risk reporting (Collier, Berry & Burke, 2006; Kleffner et al., 2003) . Examples of regulatory pressure include the NYSE Corporate Governance Rules and the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US, and the Combined Code on Corporate Governance in the UK. Adoption of the principles of these codes is typically mandatory for publicly traded firms. In the Netherlands, firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange are required to submit to the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, also known as the Tabaksblat Code. This code holds general provisions as to the maintenance of a sound risk management system. It has often been argued that ERM initiatives within organizations arise in response to regulatory pressure (e.g. Collier et al., 2006) . Because this pressure is largest for publicly listed firms, we expect such firms to be more likely to adopt ERM (cf. also Kleffner et al., 2003) :
Listed firms have more fully developed ERM systems than non-listed organizations.
Publicly traded companies, however, are not the only organizations that have been subjected to governance regulation. Governance rules are also fairly common in parts of the public and not-for-profit sector. In addition, some trade organizations have adopted governance codes as a membership requirement. We expect such organizations to have more elaborate ERM systems than organizations that need not conform to explicit governance expectations:
H2: Governance regulation is positively associated with the degree of ERM implementation.
Internal Influences
The decision to implement ERM is rather consequential, affecting the entire organization and implying major organizational change. Such far-reaching decisions require strong support from senior management. To emphasize their commitment to ERM, many organizations choose to locate ultimate responsibility for risk management explicitly at the senior executive level by appointing a Chief Risk Officer (CRO). Presumably, senior executive leadership is a powerful catalyst for organizational change, and may significantly speed up the process of ERM implementation (Beasley et al., 2005; Beasley et al., 2008) :
The presence of a CRO is positively associated with the degree of ERM implementation 3 .
Another internal factor to influence ERM development is the presence of an audit committee.
Audit committees play an important role in the oversight of risk management practices. In this monitoring role, they can exert influence on the board to ensure that ERM gets sufficient management attention, and that sufficient resources are being invested to further ERM development:
H4:
The presence of an audit committee is positively associated with the degree of ERM implementation. Liebenberg & Hoyt (2003) argue that pressure from shareholders is an important driving force behind ERM adoption (cf. also Mikes, 2009 ). As institutional block holders are typically more powerful than individual shareholders (Kane & Velury, 2004) , Liebenberg & Hoyt (2003) suggest that a higher degree of institutional ownership is positively associated with the extent of ERM adoption:
Ownership
H5: Institutional ownership is positively associated with the degree of ERM implementation.
Arguably, insider owners have even more influence over management than institutional owners, especially if these insiders hold a controlling share in the firm. This is the case in owner-managed firms. However, owner-managers have less incentive to press for ERM.
Because agency problems between owners and management are absent in owner-managed firms, the value of ERM is lower in such firms, ceteris paribus. Also, owner-managers tend to rely less on formal control systems (Lovata & Costigan, 2002) , which makes them unlikely sponsors of ERM. Therefore:
H6:
Owner-managed firms have less developed ERM systems.
Auditor influence
In the auditing literature, it is often proposed that larger auditing firms (i.e. the Big 4)
provide higher audit quality (see DeAngelo, 1981 for a classic reference and Francis, 2004 for a recent overview). Such high quality audit firms may be more persuasive in encouraging clients to improve their ERM systems and practices. In addition, it may be the case that organizations that appoint high quality auditors are also more committed to risk management (Beasley et al., 2005) , and perhaps to good governance more generally. Both lines of reasoning seem to imply that firms that engage a Big 4 audit firm are likely to have more elaborate ERM systems in place:
H7: Engagement of a Big 4 audit firm is positively associated with the degree of ERM implementation.
Firm and industry-related characteristics
For some firms, the value of ERM is larger than for others. Liebenberg & Hoyt (2003) hypothesize that ERM is especially important for firms that experience significant growth (cf. also Beasley et al., 2008; Gordon et al., 2009) . Such firms face more uncertainties and require better risk management to control the risks that arise in the process, but also to include the risk profile of various growth opportunities in organizational decision making. Thus:
H8:
Organizational growth is positively associated with the degree of ERM implementation.
The size of the organization is also likely to affect the extent of ERM adoption (Beasley et al., 2003; Kleffner et al., 2003) . Presumably, there are considerable economies of scale involved in operating an ERM system, and it may well be the case that only larger organizations can afford a fully functional ERM system:
H9:
Organizational size is positively associated with the extent of ERM implementation.
Several studies have proposed the existence of industry effects. Quite commonly, it is assumed that firms in the financial services industry are more likely to embrace ERM (Beasley et al., 2005; Kleffner et al., 2003; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003) . Since the release of Basel II, banks experience strong incentives to adopt ERM, as that may help to reduce capital requirements (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Wahlström, 2009; cf. also Mikes, 2009 ). In addition, ERM may serve as a valuable commitment device in the banking industry, lowering the cost of capital (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003) . Therefore:
H10: Firms in the financial services industry have more fully developed ERM systems.
Another sector that seems more prone to ERM adoption is the energy industry. Kleffner et al.
(2003) report that energy firms are relatively heavy ERM users, which they ascribe to the volatile markets in which these firms operate. Because ERM may reduce earnings volatility (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2003) , firms in such markets may value ERM more than firms that face stable market conditions. Accordingly:
H11: Firms in the energy sector have more fully developed ERM systems.
Unlike previous studies in this line of research, our sample includes public sector and not-forprofit organizations. The surge of risk management has not been confined to the private sector, but has affected the public sector too. Mirroring the private sector, the public sector now commonly sees risk management as an important dimension of good governance and as an aid in the achievement of organizational objectives (Woods, 2009) . The various governance codes that have been implemented in parts of the public sector are an expression of this.
There is nevertheless reason to believe that the diffusion of ERM has been slower in the public sector relative to the private sector -in spite of the countervailing effect of governance regulation. Operating in a complex and political environment, public sector organizations may find it particularly hard to operationalize their risk management agenda. Also, available risk management tools and techniques tend to be highly analytical and data-driven (Mikes, 2009 ), which may not accord very well with the dominant culture and management styles in the public sector (cf. Bhimani, 2003; Mikes, 2009 Table 3 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics. These statistics show that approximately 11% of the organizations in the sample report having a fully functional ERM system in place. Another 12.5% is currently in the process of implementing such a system. 14% do not seem to have a systematic and proactive approach to risk management.
Analysis and results
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An analysis of bivariate correlations (not tabulated for sake of brevity) indicates that the correlations between the independent variables are low, and prompt no multicollinearity concerns.
Because the dependent variable (extent of ERM implementation; STAGE) is measured on an ordinal scale, and because most of the independent variables are categorical, we test the hypotheses using ordinal logistic regression. 
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The results offer support for several of our expectations. Thus, we find that publicly traded firms do in fact have more mature ERM systems (p = 0.014; H1), whereas ownermanaged firms appear less inclined to invest in ERM development (p = 0.058; H6). Also, we find the presence of both a CRO (H3) and an audit committee (H4) to contribute to the degree of ERM implementation (p-values 0.000 and 0.001, respectively). Finally, we observe that larger organizations (p = 0.000; H9) and firms in the financial sector (p = 0.012; H10)
tend to have more sophisticated ERM systems. These results are generally consistent with the findings of previous studies.
Contrary to our expectations, we do not find an effect for institutional ownership 4 (H5).
A potential explanation could be that in the Netherlands, institutional block holders are traditionally rather reluctant to interfere with management, which typically translates into a fairly passive role of these owners. Neither do we find support for the supposed influence of governance codes (apart from the separate effect of stock exchange listing), suggesting that mandatory application of a set of governance rules does not affect ERM development. This null-funding might be caused by relatively widespread voluntary adoption of governance regulation (cf. Deumes & Knechel, 2008) , but the data do not allow a further examination of this tentative explanation.
Prior studies provide mixed evidence on the effect of growth (H8). Gordon et al. (2009) report a positive effect of growth opportunities on the extent of ERM implementation. The results of Beasley et al. (2008) and Liebenberg & Hoyt (2003) , however, do not support this finding. The results of our study are also negative in this respect. But it should be emphasized that our sample includes only 35 firms reporting high growth. Additional analysis (details not reported here) shows that many of these high growth firms are owner-managed (42%), and that almost all of them are small. Given these numbers, our null-finding may not be very informative.
It is interesting to note that in our analysis, auditor quality (H7) has no effect on ERM development. This is at odds with Beasley et al. (2005) , who do report a significant and positive auditor effect. An explanation of this difference can perhaps be found in the high quality of the Dutch audit profession. At least the Dutch professional association of certified accountants believes that the quality of the Dutch CPA is truly world-class, even in smaller firms. If this is actually true, there is no reason to expect that auditor identity matters in this Dutch sample after all.
Finally, the industry effects (H10-12) seem to be limited to the financial services sector. We observe no effects for the energy sector. However, the number of energy firms in our sample is very small (25, or only about 3% of total sample size). Neither do we observe a public sector effect, suggesting that ERM implementation is not hindered by the inherently larger complexity of the political environment in which public sector organizations operate.
ERM design and perceived effectiveness
In configuring their ERM systems, organizations need to face numerous design choices. Over the years, a large industry has emerged to assist firms in making these choices. Also, several semi-regulatory bodies have published frameworks to guide organizations in their ERM design and implementation efforts. The best known example is the COSO ERM framework (COSO, 2004a) . The COSO framework, however, only provides very broad guidance, suggesting key principles and concepts but leaving the specific details to the adopting organizations themselves. That is to say, COSO does actually attend to the everyday details of risk management practice, but only in an annex to the framework (COSO, 2004b) . This annex is explicitly not part of the framework itself, but intends to provide practical illustrations that might be useful to those seeking to apply ERM techniques. COSO emphasizes that these illustrations
should not be interpreted as preferred methods or best practices.
COSO's somewhat cautious position as to the practical side of ERM is quite sensible,
given the paucity of evidence-based knowledge of effective ERM system design. Comprehensive ERM theories do not exist, and as far as we know, there are no empirical studies that systematically document ERM practices and their contribution to ERM effectiveness. Therefore, we must assume that the application techniques described in the annex are based on anecdotal evidence at best, and COSO is right not to present these illustrations as actual prescriptions. But as a consequence, ERM-adopting organizations face very open-ended design problems, with little concrete guidance at the operational and instrumental level.
The dataset that has been made available to us includes information on specific ERM design choices, particularly in the areas of risk identification and assessment, and risk reporting and monitoring. We also have information on risk tolerance definition. These data allow us to describe current practices, tools, and techniques in these areas, providing a broad overview of their incidence and prevalence. In addition, the dataset contains information on perceived ERM effectiveness, providing the opportunity empirically to examine possible relationships between ERM practices and effectiveness. This analysis will be distinctly exploratory in nature. We have no clear theory to build on. Neither is there any prior empirical research to inform the development of hypotheses. Therefore, we shall structure the analysis around a number of research questions, and instead of trying to test theory, we shall focus the analysis on finding answers to these questions. We organize the research questions in three broad themes, corresponding with the areas identified above, i.e. risk tolerance, risk identification and assessment, and risk reporting and monitoring. But we insert two preliminary questions: does application of the COSO framework add value, and is the extent of ERM implementation associated with ERM effectiveness?
ERM design choices Preliminary questions
The 2004 COSO report is generally viewed as the most authoritative ERM framework. Given this reputation, one would expect to observe widespread application of the framework in practice. Furthermore, if this framework deserves its reputation, one would expect that its application improves ERM effectiveness. Whether this is empirically true, however, is still an open question. Hence:
Q1: Does application of the COSO ERM framework contribute to ERM effectiveness?
A very fundamental choice that has to be made in configuring ERM systems relates to the scope of these systems, i.e. which kinds of risk to include in the ERM process. Consistent with its integrative and comprehensive ambitions, the COSO ERM framework urges organizations to consider and include risks that affect the entity's objectives in four categories: strategic, operations, reporting, and compliance. In section 3, we reported on (antecedents of) the extent of ERM implementation, in which the extent of implementation (STAGE) is measured as the scope or inclusiveness of the ERM system (see table 2 ). These data suggest that organizations often opt for a narrower focus, and for instance choose not to include risks affecting attainment of strategic objectives in their formal ERM system (see the descriptive statistics in table 3 ). This observation can be interpreted in two different ways. One interpretation is that organizations generally subscribe to COSO's comprehensive ambitions, but have not been able yet fully to realize these aspirations. The other is that organizations feel that a full-blown ERM system is actually too much of a good thing for them, and choose to implement a simpler but optimal system. If the first interpretation is valid, one would expect to observe a positive association between the extent of implementation and ERM effectiveness. If the second reading is more appropriate, one would expect no relationship between these two variables.
Therefore 5 :
Q2: Is the extent of ERM implementation associated with ERM effectiveness?
Risk tolerance
The entity's risk appetite is a key concept in the COSO ERM framework. Risk appetite refers to "the amount of risk, on a broad level, an entity is willing to accept in pursuit of value" (COSO, 2004a: 19) . Risk appetite, thus, expresses the organization's risk attitude at the level of the organization as a whole. Risk appetite is the starting point of COSO-type ERM, and according to COSO, organizations need to consider and define their risk appetite, pretty much as a precondition for successful risk management. Risk appetite may be expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, and COSO declares to be indifferent between these two options.
However, the COSO framework also proposes that in addition to the expression of the entity's high level risk attitude, organizations need to define their risk attitudes at a lower level of aggregation, i.e. at the level of specific objectives. At this lower level, COSO refers to the notion of risk tolerance, which is "the acceptable level of variation relative to achievement of a specific objective" (COSO, 2004a: 20) . These risk tolerances are essentially a further specification of risk appetite, and they should help the organization to remain within the boundaries of its risk appetite. At this lower, more operational level, COSO conveys a clear preference for quantification: "risk tolerances can be measured, and often are best measured in the same units as the related objectives" (COSO, 2004a: 40) .
In these recommendations on risk appetite and tolerance, COSO espouses a highly mechanistic view on risk management. It is, however, uncertain whether such a view is realistic and practicable. For instance, Power (2009) argues that the idea of organizationwide risk appetite and risk tolerance assumes that organizations are unitary and intentional actors, which he regards as reductive, simplistic, and potentially misleading. Also, COSO seems to work from a very traditional perspective on human decision making in which agents are fully rational and risk attitudes are explicable and stable. Such a perspective is hard to maintain in the face of years of behavioural studies documenting systematic biases and situational and path dependencies in risky choice problems (e.g. Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Tverski & Kahneman, 1992) 6 .
These divergent positions feed into the third research question:
Q3: Does explication and quantification of risk tolerance improve ERM effectiveness?
Risk identification and assessment
Organizations need to address the question as to the frequency of risk identification and analysis. How often should the organization go over the risks to ensure the availability of sufficient up-to-date information to act upon? The COSO framework is silent on this issue, but it seems important nonetheless:
Q4: Is the frequency of risk assessment associated with ERM effectiveness?
Another choice variable in the area of risk identification and assessment is the number of management levels to include in the risk appraisal exercise. Is it sufficient to localize risk assessment at the senior management level, or is it appropriate to involve middle management as well? And if so; how far down does one need to go? Although COSO does not provide a 6 Remarkably, COSO appears to be well aware of this behavioural literature (see for instance COSO, 2004a: 51-52) . It is unclear why COSO has chosen to ignore the implications of this work.
clear answer to these questions, it does indicate that even though the CEO has ultimate responsibility for ERM, ERM is "the responsibility of everyone in an entity and therefore should be an explicit or implicit part of everyone's job description" (COSO, 2004a: 88 
Risk reporting and monitoring
The process of risk management -from initial risk identification via risk response selection to monitoring and evaluation-requires relevant, timely and reliable information, and organizations that implement ERM need to invest in information systems to support the risk management function. The COSO ERM framework of course acknowledges this need, but its guidance as to the actual set-up of these information systems is highly generic. COSO does, however, argue that monitoring should ideally proceed on an ongoing basis, as continuous monitoring is more effective than separate evaluations (cf. COSO, 2004a: 75-76) : separate evaluations take place after the fact and, consequently, are less able to assure a timely response to problems as and when they occur. This suggests that high frequency risk reporting is valuable, and may enhance the quality of ERM:
Q7: Does the frequency of risk reporting positively affect ERM effectiveness?
In discussing the contents of risk reporting, COSO emphasizes the need to report all indentified ERM deficiencies (COSO, 2004a: 80) . Risk reporting, however, will typically be broader, including retrospective diagnostic data on current risk profiles and ongoing risk management processes. In addition, some organizations might also demand prospective information as part of their regular risk reporting practices, e.g. information on important internal or external changes that may affect their risk exposure. It seems plausible to assume that ERM effectiveness is affected by the richness of both this retrospective and prospective information:
Q8: Does the richness of retrospective (Q8a) and prospective (Q8b) risk reporting enhance ERM effectiveness?
Control variables
In the analysis, we control for size. We also control for potential industry effects. Consistent with previous research, we found that firms in the financial services industry tend to have more fully developed ERM systems in place (see section 3). However, because the value of these systems is typically higher in the financial services industry than in other sectors, it might well be the case that the aspiration level as to the quality of the ERM system is higher in this industry as well. This would imply that perceived effectiveness is lower, ceteris paribus. We also argued in section 3 that the extent of ERM implementation is likely to be lower in the public sector, because the standard ERM approach does not seem to fit very well with the political environment in which public sector organizations operate, nor with the dominant culture and management style of these organizations. The data, however, did not support these contentions, and we observed no differences in ERM implementation between the public and the private sector. However, it is still possible that there is a public sector effect in the analysis of ERM effectiveness, and we explore this possibility by including a public sector dummy in the model.
Variables and measurement
In table 5, we summarize the research questions and we describe the operationalization of the variables. 
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A description of current ERM practices
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Some of the statistics in table 6 warrant a more elaborate discussion. The data indicate that the average organization believes that the effectiveness of its ERM system is modestly sufficient (6.44 on a 10-point scale). But about 20% of the respondents report their system to be less than satisfactory (score ≤ 5; details not tabulated), suggesting that there still is considerable room for improvement. We also observe that the average organization engages once a year in an entity-wide risk identification and assessment exercise. When interpreting this score, however, it should be emphasized that 227 organizations report never to engage in such an exercise, which is 27.5% of the total sample. Assuming that ERM cannot proceed without a periodic risk assessment, this figure implies that more than one quarter of the organizations in the sample do not apply ERM at all.
Despite is acclaimed authority, application of the COSO ERM framework is far from widespread. That is, only 21.5% of the organizations in the sample apply the COSO framework. This figure, however, may underestimate the true influence of COSO. Casual observation suggests that many organizations have hired consulting firms to help design and implement their ERM systems, and it seems plausible that the solution packages offered by these consultants are in fact heavily influenced by COSO. If this is actually the case, the (indirect)
impact of COSO on current ERM practices is much larger than the reported application rate suggests.
Another interesting fact is that the mean score on TOLERANCE is only 1.48, which in conjunction with the relatively high standard deviation (0.800) seems to imply that a quantification of risk tolerance is not very common. This is indeed the case. A further analysis of this variable (not tabulated) reveals that only 18% of the respondents express risk tolerance in quantitative terms. About two-thirds of the organizations convey that they do not explicate risk tolerance; not even in qualitative terms.
The relationship between ERM design and effectiveness: analysis and results
As already noted, the sample includes a significant number of organizations that do not apply ERM systems or processes. We exclude these from the analysis, and base the examination of ERM design and effectiveness only on the data from organizations that actually engage in periodic entity-spanning risk identification and assessment. This costs us 227 observations.
After removing two additional observations because of missing values, the final sample includes 596 organizations. 
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We explore the impact of the various design choices on ERM effectiveness by estimating a multivariate OLS model that includes all ERM design variables on which we have information, and a number of control variables to capture possible size and industry effects. Due to missing values, we lose 96 observations in this analysis, and the model is estimated using data from 500 organizations. We defer the discussion of these questions to section 5.
Several research questions in the areas of risk identification/assessment and risk reporting/monitoring can be answered affirmatively. Thus, we find that the frequency of risk assessment (Q4), the frequency of risk reporting (Q7), and both the richness of retrospective and prospective risk reporting (Q8a and Q8b) contribute to perceived ERM effectiveness.
However, we do not find a significant effect for the engagement of lower levels of management (Q5): apparently, devolvement of risk assessment does not perceptibly improve ERM effectiveness. Neither do we find that the use of quantitative risk assessment techniques (Q6) helps to advance the quality of ERM. Qua ERM effectiveness, organizational size does not seem to matter (p = 0.502). There are, however, industry effects. Firms in the financial services industry appear less satisfied with the quality of their ERM practices (p = 0.023). We also observe a significant negative effect for organizations in the public sector (p = 0.000).
These findings will also be discussed more fully in section 5.
Discussion
In this paper, we examined two broad themes relating to ERM. First, we studied the extent of ERM implementation and the factors that may help to explain cross-sectional differences in the level of adoption. In the second part of the study, we explored specific ERM design choices and their association with perceived ERM effectiveness. The first part of the paper builds on the findings of previous research into the extent of implementation (e.g. Beasley et al., 2005; Kleffner et al., 2003; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003) . Using data from 825 organizations, our study considerably broadens the empirical basis underlying this stream of research.
Specifically, whereas prior studies were based mainly on US and Canadian data, we work with data from organizations headquartered in the Netherlands, allowing some insights into the generalizability of the earlier findings in a different institutional context. Also, unlike the earlier studies, we include small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as public sector organizations. The findings largely corroborate the results of prior work. Thus, we found that publicly traded firms and organizations with a CRO and audit committee have more mature ERM systems, whereas the applicability of governance regulation does not appear to influence ERM adoption. In addition, we found that larger organizations and firms in the financial sector tend to have more sophisticated ERM systems. There is no evidence of an effect of institutional ownership, which is also consistent with previous findings. We do, however, observe that owner-managed firms are less prone to invest in ERM. Earlier studies did not include this factor. Finally, we found no auditor-related influences, suggesting that in the Netherlands, Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms are equally effective in promoting high quality ERM among their clients.
The second part of the paper addresses specific ERM design choices and their relation with ERM effectiveness. As far as we know, our paper is the first large scale empirical study to examine this relation. In the analysis, we found a positive association between the extent of ERM implementation and perceived ERM effectiveness. This finding generally supports a key premise of the COSO ERM framework, i.e. that ERM should be broad and inclusive, spanning the full set of risks that affect the entity's strategic, operational, reporting, and compliance objectives. Together with the data on the extent of ERM implementation, this result also indicates that organizations still have some work to do: only about 11% of the organizations in the sample report that their current ERM system covers all relevant risk categories.
We showed that the frequency of risk assessment, the frequency of risk reporting, and the richness of risk reporting contribute to perceived ERM effectiveness. But perhaps more interesting than these positive findings are the null-results on some of the factors included in the analysis. For instance, we found that only 21.5% of the respondents report to use the COSO ERM framework. In addition, we found that application of the COSO ERM framework as such does not contribute to ERM effectiveness. These findings raise concern as to the assumed authoritative status of this framework: if the framework is actually good, why do firms choose not to use it, and why are firms that do use it not more successful than those that don't?
Because the data do not allow a more elaborate examination, we can only speculate on the answer to this question. We do, however, reiterate an earlier remark: because the questionnaire does not capture the indirect impact of the COSO framework (e.g. through the solution packages of consulting agencies), the data may underestimate the true influence of COSO.
This may very well drive the null result just reported. But it is also possible that application of COSO just does not help very much.
Another interesting finding is that the large majority of organizations does not quantify risk tolerances. In fact, two-thirds of them do not explicate risk tolerances at all. This practice is contrary to COSO, which claims that explication of risk appetite and, subsequently, quantification of risk tolerances is pretty much a conditio sine qua non for reliable risk management. The regression results, however, indicate that explication and quantification of risk tolerances do not contribute to perceived ERM effectiveness. Also, the use of quantitative risk assessment techniques does not seem to support ERM quality. In conjunction, these findings may be taken to suggest that organizations generally see risk management as a way of thinking, rather than as a hard and measureable process. If this reading is correct, this implies that COSO's mechanistic and technocratic perspective on sound and structured risk management does not accord very well with organizational reality.
Perceived ERM effectiveness is industry-specific. Firms in the financial services industry appear less satisfied with the quality of their ERM practices -even though the implementation study indicated that they tend to have more fully developed systems. This finding suggests that firms in this industry have higher aspiration levels as to the quality of ERM systems, which is consistent with the idea that the value of these systems is typically larger in the financial services sector, ceteris paribus. In addition, we observe a significant negative effect for organizations in the public sector: on average, public sector organizations report lower ERM effectiveness than private sector organizations. In the part of the paper focussing on ERM adoption, we argued that that public sector organizations may experience unique problems in ERM implementation, because of the complex political environment in which they operate, and because of the dominant culture and management style of these organizations. The data did not corroborate this expectation, and apparently, there are no differences in the extent of ERM implementation between the public and the private sector. However, in conjunction with the negative public sector effect in the analysis of ERM effectiveness, the data suggest the following interpretation: it may be the case that in the public sector, organizations seek to conform to general expectations by implementing relatively sophisticated ERM systems from a technical point of view, even though the generic ERM concepts, tools, and techniques are less effective in a public sector context. This suggests that there may be considerable value in developing an ERM approach that is more tailored to the specific needs and circumstances of the public sector.
This study has several limitations that should be recognized when interpreting the evidence. Although we sincerely cherish the permission to use the data, the fact that we rely on secondary data forced us to focus the analysis on the factors on which we have information, rather than on the factors that are most interesting from a research point of view.
Fortunately, the two largely coincide. Nevertheless, it would have been interesting to include for instance the way in which organizations have integrated risk management in strategy setting, or elements of the internal environment in the analysis of ERM effectiveness -to name but a few of the central premises of the COSO ERM framework. For now, me must leave the exploration of these factors to future research.
Another consequence of our reliance on a pre-existing dataset is that some of our measures are rather naïve. Most variables are single item metrics. Although this is adequate for the more factual variables (actually, most of the independent variables qualify as such), several other constructs are so complex that measuring them with only one indicator is clearly not ideal. Especially the measurement of perceived ERM effectiveness could be improved, and we expect future studies to make significant progress in that area. It should also be emphasized that the measure of ERM effectiveness is based on perceptions rather than on 'hard' data. Therefore, the scores on this measure may be biased, and may also more generally be an inaccurate reflection of the actual contribution of ERM to the functioning of the organization (cf. Ittner & Larcker, 2001 ). On the other hand, the respondents are senior executives or staff members in high organizational positions, and we must assume them to be knowledgeable about the functioning of the ERM systems, and to be able to make meaningful evaluative statements about these systems. Therefore, we believe that the analysis is at least informative of current ERM practices and of the contribution of elementary ERM design choices to overall ERM quality. As a first step towards a more rigorous, evidence-based understanding of successful ERM practices, this seems well worth the effort. ERM is an integral part of the (strategic) planning & control cycle
Expectation Measurement
Regulatory influences:
• stock exchange listing (+)
• governance code (+)
STOCKEXC and GOVERNCODE are dummy variables that take on a value of 1 if the organization is listed (STOKEXC) or when governance rules apply (GOVERNCODE).
Internal influences:
• Chief Risk Officer (+)
• Audit Committee (+) CRO and AUDITCOM are dummy variables that take on a value of 1 if a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) or an audit committee (AUDITCOM) is present.
Ownership:
• institutional ownership (+)
• owner-managed firm (-)
INSTOWNER and OWNERMAN are dummy variables that take on a value of 1 if the majority of shares is owned by institutional investors (INSTOWNER), or if the firm is managed by an owner holding a controlling share (OWNERMAN).
Auditor influence:
• Big 4 audit firm (+)
BIG4 is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 audit firm.
Firm/industry characteristics:
• growth opportunities (+)
• size (+)
• industry effects:
GROWTH is an ordinal variable expressing the average yearly growth of revenues over the last 3 years (1=less than 10%, 2=between 10 and 25%; 3=more than 25%).
lnREVENUE is indicative of size and is calculated as the natural log of revenue (or the size of the budget in case of public sector organizations).
FINSERV, ENERGY, and PUBSEC are industry dummies that take on a value of 1 if the organization belongs to the financial services industry, the energy sector, or the public sector. GROWTH ( ERM effectiveness (EFFECTIVENESS) is measured by asking respondents to score the quality of their ERM systems on a 10-point scale.
Research question Measurement
Preliminary questions
• application of COSO (COSO)
• extent of ERM implementation The PROSPECT list comprises developments in risk profile, significant internal changes, significant external changes, and risk control improvements.
Control variables
See table 2. 
